government, as well as coalition members, to enforce the agreement. However, because most states do not authorize local governments to enter into development agreements, many CBAs will be enforceable only by the contracting community groups. 7 CBAs are considered by their supporters to be powerful tools for assuring that communities" needs will not be neglected by large developers. Many developers also support the negotiating process as a method by which to obtain community support and thereby avoid government refusal of their projects. CBAs have been negotiated in relation to nearly 50 development projects cities across the country.
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II. Accounting for the Growing Interest in Community Benefit Agreements
Proponents of Community Benefits Agreements cite to several trends for the growing interest in this practice: urban redevelopment and reinvestment in the face of shrinking federal aid provided to cities, the evolution of the smart growth movement and increased public concern for developer accountability. According to the Neighborhood Funders Group Study published in 2005, eight out of the 10 largest cities in the U.S. experienced population increases during the 1990s for the first time in decades and the growth rate is expected to accelerate over the next twenty years. 9 Urban scholars have coined the phrase "the back to city movement", and attribute it to an increased number of baby boomers looking to downsize and live closer to work, the post 1960s generation perception that an urban lifestyle is preferable, 10 and an influx of Asian and Latin American immigrants relocating in urban neighborhoods. 11 There are a growing number of urban centers where space limitation or geographic boundaries have created expansion barriers and have the resulting need for redevelopment of already populated areas; CBAs allow for community participation in the redevelopment process so that specified needs can be addressed. 12 While there is resurgence in urban center growth, this comes at a time when federal aid to cities has been in a long slow decline. Fear of further reductions in funding for Community Development Block Grants and concern about future federal support levels for public housing and Section 8 rent-subsidy vouchers has created increased interest in developing effective public-private partnerships to meet low-income housing needs. 13 Though city and county governments have planning departments, many emphasize "processing permits and other land use applications" and act as facilitators in the private development process rather than take a leadership role. 14 Critics hold that substantial tax incentives or subsidies are provided to developers to support new job creation, but pin community hopes upon the "ripple effect" and have too little control over the job opportunities created. 15 Billions of dollars of taxpayer monies have been funneled into Economic Development projects, but standards for urban redevelopment and developer accountability remain inconsistent, as such many projects produce "mixed results" for the existing communities. 16 Inner-city gentrification, creation of low-wage dead end jobs lacking health benefits, and the loss of affordable housing frequently occur. 17 In April 2005, the New York City Council"s Select Committee on Community Development held a series of hearings due to concerns "that despite recent economic development activity and community development efforts, thousands of City residents living in distressed New York City neighborhoods, still continue to experience high levels of concentrated poverty, joblessness, poor health outcomes and low educational achievement." 18 In testimony supporting the use of CBAs, the representative from the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development stated, "The City"s community development efforts have often been separate from the larger economic development strategy which largely consisted of tax breaks, subsidies and large scale projects ... Today"s community development needs to embrace new strategies to insure that the City"s economic development investments create truly shared prosperity, not with lip service to job creation, but with sustained and significant efforts."
19
The Smart Growth Movement, with its emphasis on development guided by "equity, economy, and the environment," is credited with the evolution of Community Benefit Agreements. 20 As Smart Growth matured, key advocates realized the need to expand their focus beyond urban sprawl and the environment and to include policy concerns related to the creation of livable cities with living wage jobs.
21 "The community benefits movement gives Smart Growth advocates a set of concrete policy tools to advance these outcomes in ways that can be measured: e.g., how many thousands of affordable housing units have been built, how many tens of thousands of living wage jobs have been guaranteed, and how many millions of dollars have been redirected towards community services." 
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III. Examples of CBAs
A. California
The first CBA was negotiated in 1998 in relation to the planned development of the Hollywood and Highland Center, now home to the Kodak Theater, which hosts the annual Oscar ceremonies. 23 The development, which includes more than 4,000 theater seats, several parking lots and hotels, and 1.2 million square feet of retail space was projected to cost $388 million. 24 The eight and a half acre project understandably sparked concerns among Hollywood residents and business owners, including fears of increased traffic and congestion, possible environmental effects, increased crime and impacts on the city"s aesthetics. 25 However, with the help of Los Angeles Councilwoman Jackie Goldberg and the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), the developer struck a deal: in exchange for community support, the developer offered to finance traffic improvements, ensure that workers at the Center would be paid a living-wage and to implement a first-source hiring plan and a policy of union-neutrality. 26 The deal, though, was not one-sided; community support of the development also helped the developer to obtain $90 million in subsidies from the city.
27 By most accounts the project has been a success: in addition to revitalizing Hollywood Boulevard, nearly 70% of the initial employees hired at the complex were recruited from the immediate area and about half of the permanent positions provide living-wages.
28
The success of the Hollywood and Highland CBA was followed in 2001 by the completion of the first full fledged CBA. This CBA concerned the Los Angeles Staple Center, a sports arena that is home to several professional teams, including the Los Angeles Lakers. 29 Community residents had suffered a blow when the developer failed to provide orally promised benefits after the completion of the project"s first phase. 30 The CBA model was hoped to provide assurances of the developer"s responsibility in relation to the development of a sports and entertainment complex surrounding the previously constructed arena, a project affecting a twenty-seven acre parcel and including two hotels, a 7,000-seat theater, a 250,000 square foot expansion of the convention center, two apartment buildings and a retail complex. Negotiations were held between the developer and the Figuera Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice, which represented more than thirty community organizations, including environmental groups, church groups, health organizations and immigrants" and tenants" rights supporters. Strategic Action for a Just Economy (SAJE) and LAANE were also involved in the negotiating process, which lasted over nine months, providing organizational and political support to the coalition and community members. 31 The spectre of broad community opposition to the project, which required significant land use variances and city subsidies, provided the community with the necessary leverage to negotiate a comprehensive CBA. The completed agreement states that its purposes are to "provide publicly accessible park space, open space, and recreational facilities; target employment opportunities to residents in the vicinity of the Figueroa Corridor; provide permanent affordable housing; provide basic services needed by the Figueroa Corridor community; and address issues of traffic, parking, and public safety." 32 The CBA also included reporting requirements and established an Advisory Committee to monitor and enforce the agreement and to maintain a dialogue between the developer and the Coalition. 33 The CBA was also incorporated into the development agreement between the developer and the city"s Community Redevelopment Agency, making it enforceable by the city as well as by the contracting community groups.
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Although the first phase of the "L.A. Live" sports and entertainment complex will not open until mid-2007, 35 several aspects of the CBA were implemented shortly after its completion, including the establishment of a residential parking permit program and the distribution of seed money for the construction of affordable housing. 36 31 Id. 32 Id; Staples Center Community Benefits Agreement, at section I, available at http://saje.net/publications/communitybenefits.pdf. More specifically, the developer agreed to the following provisions:
To provide at least $1,000,000 for the creation or improvement of parks and recreational facilities; To provide $25,000 per year for a term of five years for the creation of a permit parking program; To comply with the city"s living wage ordinance and to make all reasonable efforts to reach the goal of ensuring that 70% of the jobs created by the project pay a living wage; To give priority hiring to persons displaced by the project and to low income individuals residing within three miles of the project; To coordinate job training programs with community groups; To provide $100,000 in seed money for the creation of the First Source Referral System; To set aside 20% of the residential units constructed within the project as affordable-housing and to provide $650,000 in interest-free loans to non-profit housing developers for the creation of additional affordable housing; And to cooperate with the Coalition to establish an Advisory Committee to assist with the implementation and enforcement of the agreement. Id. Additionally, the developer signed separate card check/neutrality agreements with five union organizations. See Community Benefits Agreements Victories, supra note 14. 33 Staples Center Community Benefits Agreement, supra note 17, at section XI. 34 Community Benefits Agreements Victories, supra note 14. 35 Another Los Angeles CBA demonstrates the flexibility and adaptability of this method of negotiating. In December, 2004, the Los Angeles City Council approved the agreement reached between Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA), the public administrator of LAX airport, and a coalition of twenty-two community groups concerning an $11 billion airport expansion. 37 Among the coalition"s members were two local school districts and organizations representing community, religious, environmental and labor interests. 38 In addition to provisions covering job training and first-source hiring for community residents and living-wage requirements, 39 the CBA also devotes substantial resources toward mitigating the environmental impacts of the airport. The airport is thus required to provide more than $8.5 million annually for the soundproofing of local schools, city buildings, places of worship and homes 40 and to fund studies on air quality and community health. 41 Additionally, the CBA requires LAX to implement a number of environmental controls, including the electrification of passenger gates and cargo areas (to reduce the need for engine idling), emissions reductions and the conversion of airport vehicles to alternative fuels. 42 While the provisions of the LAX CBA are notable for their specificity to the project, the CBA also clearly requires LAWA to incorporate CBA provisions into all new and revised airport contracts, lease agreements, and licensing or permitting agreements, thus ensuring the translation of the requirements to entities other than LAWA operating at LAX. 39 LAX Community Benefits Agreement, at sections V-VI, IV, available at http://www.laane.org/docs/policy/cbas/LAX_CBA.pdf. The CBA also establishes a program to encourage the involvement of women and minority owned businesses. Id. at section XIII. 40 Id. at section III. The "Aircraft Noise Mitigation Program" also requires LAX to limit nighttime departures. The noise mitigation concessions were seen as an especially important aspect of the CBA to local schools, many of which had boarded up their windows in attempts to avoid the noise. As one community activist explained, "[g]enerations [of students] have come and gone through school here with rattling windows, teachers they couldn't hear, and no natural light in their classroom experience…." Daniel B. Wood, In Los Angeles, a unique plan to dull the roar of jets, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 21, 2004. 41 LAX Community Benefits Agreement, supra note 24, at sections VII-VIII. 42 Id. at section X. 43 Id. at section V(A). For example, LAWA has recently required area hotels to reduce the number of airport shuttle trips made daily in order to comply with the CBA"s air quality provisions. The Ball Park Village CBA included environment-friendly requirements that the developer meet LEED green building standards for the development; and Use of bio-diesel fuel for all diesel construction equipment on site; Good-faith efforts to include "bird-friendly" structural elements, such as nonreflective windows; Mitigation, monitoring and reporting programs to reduce pollution during construction. Living wages for developer and service contractor employees; "a local hiring program for construction employees, permanent employees, and service workers at the project"; "responsible contracting requirements"; "$1.5 million for job training of local residents"; "affordable housing creation that exceeded city requirements", with 75% of affordable housing created to be 2 or 3 bedroom units. "Commitment to attract a grocery store operator who pays living wages and benefits"; "$100,000 in funding for a gentrification study of the impact of downtown development on surrounding communities; and" "$50,000 in funding for arts, youth, and culture services in the surrounding communities." 45 Other CBAs to have been completed in California include agreements concerning the San Jose CIM project, and the Sunquest, Noho Commons and Marlton Square developments in Los Angeles. 46 While the CBA negotiating process in California has generally proceeded within the development agreement framework, involving community groups, organizing groups and local officials, the process of developing CBAs in other areas of the country has proved to be more varied.
B. New York City
The first New York CBA was completed in 2005 in relation to the $3.5 billion development of the Atlantic Yards arena, future home to the Nets basketball team, and an attached residential and office complex to be made up of several high-rise buildings.
The agreement was negotiated by eight community groups 48 and was based on the Staples Center CBA. It includes affordable housing, 49 living wage, first source and minority hiring provisions, 50 and it also offers the perks of free basketball tickets for neighborhood residents and the construction of a daycare center. 51 Reaction to the agreement has not been completely positive, however. First, unlike the agreements reached in California, the Atlantic Yards CBA is not incorporated into a development agreement with the city, making enforcement possibly more difficult. Secondly, concerns have been raised in relation to the propriety of the CBA negotiating process. It has been suggested the eight-member coalition did not adequately represent the needs of the Brooklyn community, 52 and critics have pointed out that several of the coalition members will receive funds from the developer, Forest City Ratner, as part of the deal. 53 Given that the Atlantic Yards project will ultimately receive more than $200 million in state and city funds, it has even been suggested that the CBA is inherently undemocratic in its exclusion of the broader New York City and state community. 50 The developer has promised to use "good faith" in order to award 35% of the construction jobs to minority contractors and to create a job training program for local workers. Id. 51 Kolben, supra note 30. 52 In addition to the fact that only eight groups participated in the negotiations, is has been pointed out that several of the groups were created just prior to or during the negotiations. Furthermore, critics have suggested that some of the community groups may not be experienced enough to properly administer the CBA"s provisions. The C.B.A. Tourney, supra note 32. At least one community group has been particularly vehement in criticizing the Atlantic Yards CBA, calling it "a sham and a fraud that reaches new lows in killing community participation[.]" Press Release, Develop Don"t Destroy Brooklyn, Ratner "Community Benefits Agreement" (CBA) is DOA And Brooklyn Community Board Chairs Helped Kill It (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://dddb.net/php/press/pdfs/111804CBAdoa.pdf. 53 Ratner has reportedly distributed $275,000 to three of the community group signatories, and is expected to award additional contracts to another signatory to market affordable housing. The C.B.A. Tourney, supra note 32. 54 As the former president of New York City"s Economic Development Corporation explained, "If the public is putting money into the project and the developer is allocating that money in private deals with the community, it is not government setting the priorities. Generally speaking, it is city taxpayer dollars that are being spent in not necessarily high priority areas….It shouldn"t be some local community groups making these decisions. It should be a cross-section of the community and city government. 56 While the agreement does include a number of valuable community benefits, the developer will only be fined $60,000 for failing to comply with the CBA, weakening the value of the CBA in the eyes of many stakeholders. 57 Critics have also drawn attention to the subtleties of some of the contract"s provisions: the amount of retail space reserved for local retailers makes up only a minimal portion of the mall"s square footage; and the living wage and minority hiring provisions are not expressly enforceable as to the developer"s tenants. 58 Finally, community groups have criticized the negotiation process for being neither transparent nor inclusive. Although eighteen groups representing various interests were selected by the Borough President to participate in the process, they were given only about a month to prepare a draft CBA and were not given any assistance in the process. Evidently, this resulted in many of the community groups having little influence in the actual negotiations. 59 When the organizations received copies of the completed CBA the morning of the council vote to approve the development plans, only three of them signed the agreement. At least seven organizations refused to sign the CBA.
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The Yankee Stadium CBA, completed in 2006, has also faced criticism. The agreement, to begin with, was made between the Yankees, the Bronx Borough President and the Bronx Delegation of the New York City Council; it was not negotiated or signed by any community groups. One of the agreement"s most controversial provisions is the trust fund that it created to be administered by "an individual of prominence" through distributions to local nonprofit groups. 61 Because the fund"s trustee will be appointed by approved. A CBA is simply the community groups saying: if we have legal assurance that it"s a project we like, we"ll support it; if not, we won"t. What could be more democratic than that? Id. 55 The Gateway Center at the Bronx Terminal Market is a retail development that will replace the Bronx Terminal Market, which was located on city-owned land and housed a number of local retailers, many of whom were ethnic food vendors. In arranging to purchase the land from the city, the developer obtained tax exemptions and also benefited from the city"s agreement to pay for the demolition of the old market, guarantee loans and help pay to relocate the market"s vendors. the same elected officials responsible for the CBA, it has been referred to as a "slush fund" by critics who fear that funding will be not be distributed impartially. 62 The Yankee Stadium CBA has also been criticized due to the fact that the development will eliminate more than twenty acres of parks, leaving the city to pay for their replacement in addition to the subsidies already being given to the project. 63 It is probably fair to say that the New York CBAs have been criticized more than necessary. While they may not have satisfied all of the groups and individuals involved, New York City has not benefited from the strong presence of community organizing groups of the type that has helped to ensure the success of CBAs in California. Furthermore, New York State does not authorize development agreements, which provide a framework for local governments to participate in CBA negotiations. 64 Quite the opposite is true; local officials in New York City have, until recently, been discouraged from allowing community benefits to influence land use decisions for fear of distorting the planning and review process. 65 In a 1988 report that continues to reflect the issues surrounding community benefits, the New York City Bar Association cautioned that:
The ad hoc payment of money or services in return for favorable government action also adversely affects the decision-making process. In egregious cases, the decision maker is corrupted. In less egregious cases, satisfying the wish list for a borough president, community board or a mayor enhances the recipient"s political power. The decision-maker may accept the project in order to get the unrelated amenities, when perhaps it should be voted down. Thus integrity is eroded, of the government in general and of the zoning laws and land use regulations in particular. 66 The opposition to CBAs in New York may be at least partly attributed to these fears. This may also explain the lack of praise for the New York CBAs (other than by developers, and occasionally by elected officials); while they may not be as comprehensive as desired, the CBAs do provide community amenities that might not have otherwise been obtained.
Still, the city"s response to these recent CBAs has not helped to resolve how CBAs should be conducted in New York. Previous New York City mayors Rudy Giuliani and Ed Koch both criticized CBA-like arrangements as distorting the planning process through buying off opponents. 67 While Mayor Bloomberg originally supported the Atlantic Yards CBA, he seemed to change his opinion of them when he charged a CBA relating to the new Mets stadium as constituting "a ransom."
68 And while the city has supported the projects being developed under the CBAs, it has not expressed any policies as to how the agreements should be negotiated.
CBA supporters are hoping, though, that a new agreement concerning Columbia University"s expansion into West Harlem will provide a better model for future New York CBAs. The city and Mayor Bloomberg have been especially supportive of this CBA, providing funds and technical assistance for the negotiating process. While the city is not expressly claiming that this CBA should serve as a model for future developments, it has recognized that CBAs are likely to become more prevalent in the future. 69 And if the negotiators are successful in creating a CBA, it is likely that it will, in fact, influence future CBAs within New York City, as the negotiating processes being used are more transparent and inclusive than previous efforts. 70 The process of developing a CBA in relation to the Columbia expansion 71 has been markedly different than the other New York CBAs from the start. Rather than being driven primarily by the developers or elected officials, County Board 9 authorized the creation of a local development corporation (LDC) to be composed of appointed community leaders who represent a broad range of constituents. 72 72 Id. The LDC"s mission is to "win support of and leverag[e] the community-base planning of Community Board 9, provide an organizational structure to focus community input in order to negotiate and monitor a community benefits agreement with developers of large scale developments in Community District 9 in a Community Board originally intended that the LDC would not include any elected officials, after the LDC"s first meeting it revised this decision, but only after analyzing the conflicts of interest present among the elected officials who will hold voting positions on the board. 73 Public meetings began September, 2006 and have continued on a weekly basis with working groups devoted to housing, business and economic development, employment, education, historic preservation, community facilities and social services, arts and culture, environmental stewardship, transportation, research and laboratory activities and green spaces. 74 Negotiations with Columbia representatives began in January, 2007, and are being facilitated by a mediator paid for by the city"s Economic Development Corporation.
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C. Other notable CBAs
In Connecticut, a CBA concerning Yale University"s construction of new cancer center was reached in 2006. The community was represented by CORD (Community Organized for Responsible Development), a coalition of twenty-two community groups, faith-based organizations and local unions. 76 The CBA also received support from the city, which used the California CBAs as a model when the Board of Alderman passed a resolution encouraging the hospital to enter into the agreement. 77 Provisions included in the CBA relate to affordable housing, job training and local hiring, traffic and parking, union organizing rights and environmental issues. 78 One of the more unique aspects of the Yale-New Haven CBA is that the hospital also agreed to fund outreach programs that will provide medical care to uninsured children and children suffering from asthma. 79 A 2005 Milwaukee CBA known as the Park East Redevelopment Compact (PERC) was the first CBA to be implemented through legislation rather than through negotiations between the community and the developer. 80 The agreement arose when 64 acres of land in downtown Milwaukee became available after a highway spur was torn down. Because parts of the land were owned by the city, the county, and various private developers, the Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhood Commission could not undertake negotiations with a single prospective developer. Rather, the Coalition hoped to have its CBA incorporated into the city"s Park East Redevelopment Plan. 81 The Common Council, however, failed to adopt the CBA, with some "suggest[ing] that there were better ways to meet community needs, while others argued that it "was bad public policy" that would put Milwaukee "at a greater competitive disadvantage with the suburbs."" 82 Despite this setback by the city, however, the PERC was later passed by the County Board. 83 The CBA, under this legislation, applies to sixteen acres of county lands and requires developers to provide living wages for construction jobs, to incorporate green design elements into constructions and to implement job training programs. The PERC also requires the county to provide for affordable housing and to contribute to various community programs, such as those to train and find placements for minority workers. Additionally, the PERC set up a Community and Economic Development Fund to be financed by land sales. The fund is to support the Community Advisory Board, which will oversee and monitor the PERC. 84 In Minneapolis, a 2006 CBA has demonstrated that these agreements need not be limited to physical developments. The agreement was developed in relation to the creation of a city-wide wi-fi network. As a concession to city council members that wanted the network to be publicly operated, supporters of the public-private option that eventually prevailed agreed that the city would adopt a CBA designed to minimize the digital divide. 85 As explained by the Digital Inclusion Task Force, which was created to make recommendations to the city council, "[the] "Digital Inclusion" community benefits agreement is designed to expand technology access and literacy opportunities for Minneapolis" low-income residents and other underserved populations…." 86 The Task Force worked with community groups to develop the CBA and it has recommended that the wi-fi vendor be required to comply with the city"s living wage ordinance, that it provide both subscription-based services and free wi-fi service financed by advertisements, and that it will put 7% of its gross revenues into a Digital Inclusion Fund. 87 Organizers in Chicago are working on negotiating a similar digital access CBA. 88 The Gates Rubber Company redevelopment project in Denver was the subject of a CBA finalized in 2006. 89 Located on a fifty-acre brownfield in downtown Denver, the developer plans to demolish the abandoned rubber plant and clean up the site. In its place, an eight million square foot residential and retail center will be built. 90 A coalition of community and labor groups was organized by the Front Range Economic Strategy Center (FRESC) to participate in the negotiations, which lasted for more than three years. 91 Among the provisions of the agreement are benefits related to affordable housing, living wages for construction jobs, first-source hiring and continued communication between the developer and the community concerning the site"s clean-up. The developer also agreed not to allow any big-box stores to be included in the redevelopment In exchange for these benefits, the developer was supported by the community in seeking $126 million in city subsidies. 92 During the negotiation process, it became clear that contaminants from the site had leached into neighboring areas. Because of this, members of the coalition formed the Voluntary Cleanup Advisory Board, and with the developer"s help, they tested neighborhoods adjacent to the factory for environmental contamination. The developer also agreed to make documents related to the site"s cleanup available to residents at a local library. 93 Community groups around the country have picked up on the CBA trend. Organizations in Albany (NY), 94 Atlanta, 95 Charleston (SC), 96 Miami, 97 New Orleans and Seattle, 99 for example, have completed CBAs or are currently trying to initiate negotiations.
III. Practical Problems with CBAs
CBAs have proven to be effective tools for many communities hoping to require developers to provide amenities to the neighborhoods that they affect. However, negotiating a CBA may not be appropriate in all situations. 100 For a CBA to be fair and effective, it is necessary that the community negotiating the CBA have adequate leverage to obtain meaningful promises from a developer. In some situations, a developer"s need to locate the project in specific place or the possibility of obtaining significant public subsidies will provide a large amount of leverage to community groups. As the executive director of the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency has remarked, CBAs "work best when there is substantial agency money invested, when they"re big projects, and when they"re in hot markets or emerging markets." 101 When these elements are missing, CBAs are often criticized as creating development barriers that encourage developers to simply find other, less costly, locations.
Even with the leverage created by public subsidies and prime locations, a community"s interests must still be supported by a broad-based coalition of community groups in order for the coalition to retain its leverage and political capital. 102 Bad precedent and publicity may be created by coalitions that are poorly organized and that do not accurately represent the interests of most of the community stakeholders. 103 The same is true of coalitions that obtain weak benefits. The "divide and conquer" techniques used by developers to balkanize coalitions also require community groups to be united and to have coherent goals. Otherwise, a developer may attempt to appease some community groups without meeting others" needs. Developers in this situation often spend less on CBA provisions while still being able to spin their projects as being community-supported. 104 Building broad-based and united coalitions, however, is not a simple task. The organizational needs required by such coalitions are often daunting to community groups experienced mainly in promoting their own campaigns, and determining and prioritizing the goals shared among diverse community groups may lead to conflicts among constituents supporting different goals. 105 Assuming that a broad-based coalition is formed to contract a CBA with developers, the negotiation process may also raise practical problems for communities. Where a coalition is inexperienced in creating CBAs, for example, it may need guidance as to the types of benefits that it can receive. The funding required to conduct research for CBA provisions and to pay for legal counsel may also inhibit the negotiating process. 106 Furthermore, most CBAs include monitoring and enforcement provisions that require coalitions to engage in future activities related to the CBA; and for coalitions that formed for the specific purpose of negotiating a CBA, continuing this energy into monitoring and enforcement may be difficult.
IV. Legal Issues Related to CBAs
The validity and enforceability of CBAs has yet to be tested in court, but some lawyers have expressed concerns that the agreements will not hold up.
Chief among the questions as to the validity of CBAs is whether community groups provide any real consideration for these contracts. While supporters argue that a coalition"s promise to support a development before land use authorities constitutes sufficient consideration, others have argued that such promises may be considered insufficient when compared to the extensive benefits offered by developers. 107 Under contract theory, though, which does not generally inquire into the adequacy of consideration, promises not to oppose developments are likely to be deemed supported by consideration. 108 Questions have also been raised as to who can enforce a CBA"s provisions. Because contract law generally permits only contract signatories to enforce its provisions, CBA supporters have encouraged coalitions to require each community group to separately sign CBAs. Otherwise, the dissolution of a coalition or the inability to define the coalition"s agents may prevent a CBA from being enforceable. 109 Where local governments are authorized to enter into development agreements, CBA supporters highly encourage that CBAs be incorporated into these agreements so that they can be enforced by local governments as well. 110 Whether or not individual community members will be considered third-party beneficiaries capable of enforcing CBAs has not been widely discussed.
Enforceability questions may also concern which parties are bound by developers" promises. Many CBAs contain language indicating an intent that a CBA"s provisions will be binding upon the development"s future tenants, contractors or buyers. If a CBA does not require these future parties to sign the CBA or a similar agreement with the developer, community groups need to ensure that the contract language used is clear and specific enough to impose these requirements.
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Because the process of negotiating CBAs often involves local governments or elected officials, CBAs may also raise legal issues related to the propriety of planning process. Development agreements may provide a framework for incorporating CBAs into this process, but most states do not authorize local governments to enter into these agreements. 112 In these states, as in New York, CBAs may be criticized for distorting the planning process. Some opponents have gone so far as to characterize CBAs as "extortion." 113 The history of exactions law in the United States, which generally prohibits local governments from requiring developers to provide benefits not substantially related the development project, may also provide support to CBA opponents. 114 Even without invoking exactions, though, CBAs created through a process involving significant contributions by local officials are likely to raise questions about conflicts of interests. In these situations, care must be taken that CBA negotiators are not too involved with planning or other political decisions.
At the same time, though, local governments may be faulted for not involving themselves enough in CBA negotiations. Under this view, some argue that local governments should ensure that negotiating teams accurately represent community interests. 115 This may be achieved by a local government facilitating the creation of a CBA bargaining team, as happened in relation to the Columbia University CBA, 116 or by the local government"s willingness to take a CBA"s comprehensiveness into account when evaluating it during the land use planning process.
V. Checklist of Issues to Review in Considering the Use of CBAs
What follows is a checklist to use in identifying the issues that should be considered as CBAs are contemplated by developers and by community groups. The benefits and remedies are typically items that are all "on the table" when negotiating the agreement. In addition, depending upon whether the government is a party to the agreement and/or is assigned responsibilities under the agreement, the threshold question of whether state statutory authority exists for such involvement is critical.
What constitutes a breach on the part of the developer? What constitutes a breach on the part of the community? What are the remedies in the event of a breach? Are the remedies specific to each benefit? What type of notice is required before relief is sought? Will the right to request specific performance be included? Is equitable relief permitted in the event of an irreparable injury? Who is responsible for attorney"s fees in the event of a court action? Will the other clauses of a CBA remain in effect in the event of a breach? Are there any intended third-party beneficiaries?
VI. Sample Provisions in Existing CBAs
There is of course, no magic formula in terms of content of the CBAs since each agreement is a individually negotiated deal based on a number of unique factors presented in each community. At times, personalities of the parties may also play a role, as will level of trust, community needs and scale of the proposed project. Appended to this paper is a comparison of provisions of the following five select CBAs: Atlantic Yards (NY), Staples Center (CA), Ballpark Village (CA), Marlton Square (CA), and LAX (CA).
VII. Conclusion
While CBAs represent an opportunity to accomplish redevelopment projects in a manner that achieves social equity and engages all community stakeholders in the project with an eye towards designing a process and product that can be win-win for communities, myriad legal issues are present for all involved participants. Land Use attorneys can expect to begin to hear more about these types of agreements, and may be called upon more to help negotiate and development a CBA for interested clients. Although the projects highlighted in this paper are substantial in scope, much smaller and perhaps simpler CBAs are likely to start appearing in mid-sized and smaller communities across the country.
